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Mental Illness and the Courts:
Some Reflections on Judges as Innovators
John P. Petrila and Allison D. Redlich

I

On January 18, 2006, the Conference of Chief Justices
adopted a resolution endorsing the use of problem-solving
courts to address the impact of mental illness upon the criminal justice system.1 This resolution formally acknowledged the
emergence of therapeutic courts as part of the jurisprudential
mainstream. As important, it highlighted the changing role of
the judiciary in response to the many issues caused by the
prevalence and volume of serious mental illnesses among
defendants in courts across the country.2 In fact, as this article
suggests, state judges have been responsible for some of the
most innovative solutions to these issues, a trend likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Some judges have embraced
this new role, others have not, but—regardless of perspective—it is difficult for any criminal judge today to simply
ignore the issue of mental illness.

There were approximately 14 million arrests in the United
States in 2005.3 The most conservative estimate is that approximately 900,000 of these arrestees were acutely mentally ill at
the time of the arrest.4 When substance abuse and other mental illness diagnoses are considered, the prevalence of mental
disorder among arrestees is over 70%.5 In addition, it is estimated that between 16% and 24% of people who are in jails
and prisons have a major diagnosable mental illness such as
depression, schizophrenia, or other psychotic or bipolar disorders.6 Again, if all mental disorders—including substanceabuse disorders—are included, the prevalence of mental disorder in incarcerated populations is over 70%.
Until three decades ago, the majority of people with severe
mental illnesses were confined for at least part of the time in
state psychiatric hospitals. However, since then there has been
a major diminution of the role of state hospitals, while the
number of people with mental illnesses in jails and prisons has
increased significantly. For example, in 2000, people with
severe mental illnesses were more than five times likely to be
confined to a jail than to a state psychiatric hospital (the rate
of hospitalization in state psychiatric hospitals was 22 people
per 100,000, but the rate of confinement in jail was 113 people with severe mental illnesses per 100,000.7) This is not to
suggest that the answer to the problem of mental disorder in
the criminal justice system is to recreate the state psychiatric
hospital system. Rather, as we suggest below, the lack of effective community treatment in many jurisdictions is a more
pressing issue than the absence of state hospital beds. In addition, changes in sentencing policy, particularly regarding substance-abuse offenses, has contributed to the influx of people
with mental disorders. However, regardless of why it has hap-

Footnotes
1. Conference of Chief Justices, Policy Statements and Resolutions,
Resolution 11, In Support of the Judicial Criminal Justice/Mental
Health Leadership Initiative, January 18, 2006, available at
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/CriminalAdultResolutions/resol11Judicial
CriminalJusticeMentalHealthInitiative.html.
2. Therapeutic courts are a comparatively recent development; the
first drug court emerged in 1989 in Dade County, Florida, and the
first mental-health courts of this era began in 1997 in Broward
County, Florida and Marion County, Indiana. Today there are
more than 1,000 such courts in the United States and their “fit”
within the traditional justice system has been the subject of frequent discussion, including in this journal. For an example, see
Daniel J. Becker & Maura D. Corrigan, Moving Problem-Solving
Courts Into the Mainstream: A Report Card from the CCJ-COSCA
Problem-Solving Courts Committee, COURT REVIEW, Spring 2002, at
1. See also Aubrey Fox and Greg Berman, Going to Scale: A
Conversation About the Future of Drug Courts, COURT REVIEW, Fall
2002, at 4. Therapeutic courts have been developed in a number

of other countries as well. John Petrila, An Introduction to Special
Jurisdiction Courts. 26 INT’L J. LAW AND PSYCH. 3 (2003).
Table 29, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
Crime in the United States (2005), available at http://www.fbi.
gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_29.html.
NAT’L GAINS CTR., THE PREVALENCE OF CO-OCCURRING MENTAL
ILLNESS AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS IN JAILS (rev. ed. 2004), available at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/pdfs/disorders/gainsjailprev.pdf.
Id.
RICHARD LAMB AND LINDA E. WEINBERGER, THE SHIFT OF PSYCHIATRIC
INPATIENT CARE FROM HOSPITALS TO JAILS AND PRISONS, 33 J. AMER.
ACAD. PSYCH. & LAW 529 (2005). For the underlying data behind
Lamb and Weinberger’s estimates, see NAT’L COMM’N ON
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, 2 THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BERELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ix-x, 57-80 (2002),
available at http://www.ncchc.org/pubs/pubs_stbr.html.
Id.

ssues raised by the influx of defendants with serious mental
illnesses are some of the most important that criminal
judges confront. Because of the volume of defendants with
mental illnesses, the impact goes beyond that of the individual
case and extends to jails, police and sheriff departments, the
treatment system, and ultimately to the role of the judge. This
article suggests some of the ways in which communities have
attempted to respond to these issues, and highlights the fact
that judges have become significant leaders as well as innovators in such efforts. Not every judge will decide to adopt one
or more of these roles, but regardless, it is likely that the issues
that mental illness creates for the criminal justice system will
exist far into the future.
PART 1. MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
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pened, it is clear that there are many more individuals with
major mental illnesses in the criminal justice system today
than was the case 20 or 30 years ago.
The increase poses serious problems for the individual and
for the justice system. People with mental illnesses are jailed
on average two to three times longer than individuals without
a mental illness arrested for a similar crime. A stay in jail may
exacerbate the person’s illness, and an arrest record may further complicate the person’s efforts to live successfully in the
community. In addition, jails incur significant costs associated
with the oversight of individuals with mental illnesses (particularly regarding the threat of suicide) and for medication and
other health-care services.
Mental-illness issues also present complications for a judge.
Many criminal courts have overburdened dockets, which allow
little time for an individual case. Yet dispositional questions
involving a defendant with an acute mental illness are often
not readily resolved. Ordering a competency examination may
be easy; deciding whether and how to gain access to treatment
that the individual needs may be considerably more difficult.8
In addition, judges often encounter the same defendant with
mental illness repeatedly; the individual is arrested usually for
a comparatively minor offense, is released often for time served
but with no access to treatment, and is then rearrested for the
same type of offense. This cycle with “repeat defendants” creates frustration for judges unable to gain access to treatment
that might have some impact on the defendant’s behavior.
As the impact of mental illness on the criminal justice system has grown, judges increasingly have become leaders in
seeking innovative solutions. This has often been by default;
few judges take the bench with a primary goal of designing
solutions to systemic issues that often appear to flow from failures in the mental-health and human-services systems. Yet in
many communities, judges may be the only officials with the
necessary formal and symbolic authority to create change.
This article describes a number of innovations that have
been developed by individual judges and others within the
criminal justice system in response to mental-illness issues. We
first briefly describe the realities of today’s mental-health system, which provides the context in which many criminal
courts now sit. We then briefly discuss a number of discrete
initiatives (pre-arrest diversion programs; post-arrest diversion
programs, including therapeutic courts; post-disposition oversight, including specialty probation for defendants with mental illness) that various communities have tried. We conclude
with some comments on the role of the judge in identifying
and resolving these issues. We do not suggest that these initiatives are a good fit for every community. In fact, it is quite clear
that local circumstances are the first thing that must be considered in determining which solutions to attempt. Nor will

8. It may be difficult even to gain access to treatment services for
competency restoration. In Florida, judges held the Secretary of
the state agency responsible for providing such services in contempt because of long waiting lists for beds in the hospitals
charged with providing competency restoration. Abby
Goodnough, Officials Clash Over Mentally Ill in Florida Jails, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006.

every judge wish to adopt a
proactive role in seeking
solutions. But addressing
the needs of defendants
with serious mental illnesses will be a problem
that confronts virtually
every criminal court judge,
and so it may be useful,
particularly for judges new
to these issues, to have
information regarding the
strategies
communities
have used in response.

[M]any defendants
with serious mental
illness are arrested
on relatively minor
charges, and
therefore formal
competency
adjudications . . .
may have little
appeal . . . .

Contextual issues. Mental illness has always been an issue
in the criminal justice system, primarily because of its potential impact on mental state. Competency to stand trial assessments were (and continue to be) a staple of criminal proceedings, and the insanity defense and related pleas—such as
guilty but mentally ill—have continuing relevance in a modest number of cases. In addition, courts have long made mental-health treatment a condition of disposition in resolving
some criminal cases.
However, these traditional tools have little relevance to the
vast majority of the people arrested each year who are acutely
ill at the time of arrest. This is for at least two reasons. First,
many defendants with serious mental illness are arrested on
relatively minor charges, and therefore formal competency
adjudications and pleas of insanity may have little appeal as a
practical matter, though legally they might be preferred.
Second, even if these mechanisms were employed in every one
of the 900,000 cases in which the defendant is acutely ill at the
time of arrest, it would only further exacerbate the problem of
overburdened court dockets, because these issues do not lend
themselves to quick disposition. As a result, many of the innovations discussed below are designed either to reduce the number of acutely ill defendants who enter the criminal justice system or to shorten the time spent there.
There have also been major changes in the last few decades
in the treatment of people with serious mental illnesses.9
Three are relevant here. First, the location and duration of
much treatment has changed. State psychiatric hospitals used
to provide most long-term care for serious mental illnesses.
Most psychiatric hospital care today is provided in community
outpatient settings because of a number of factors, including
horrific conditions that developed in many state hospitals, as
well as changing philosophies of—and advancements in—
treatment. Community outpatient care is designed largely to
control and reduce symptoms. Inpatient care is generally

9. It should be noted that the influx of people with drug-abuse disorders that eventually resulted in the development of drug courts
was caused in large part by changes in criminal laws, which
brought more defendants into the criminal justice system for
offenses related to substance abuse and resulted in lengthier sentences as well. See Petrila, supra note 2.
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short-term, and occurs most
often in psychiatric units of
community hospitals. There
is little long-term, inpatient
care for psychiatric illnesses
available in the United States
today.
Second, and relatedly, most
people with serious mental illnesses spend the vast majority
of their time in the community. At this juncture, it is beyond dispute that most people with
serious mental illnesses can be treated successfully in the community and live productive lives, even if they suffer relapses
during treatment.10 However, the network of treatment services, social supports, and housing necessary to provide such
treatment is rarely available in sufficient supply and in many
communities is woefully lacking. As a result, many people with
serious mental illnesses receive little or inadequate treatment.
As a result, the symptoms of serious mental illness may be exacerbated. Mental illness does not necessarily lead to arrest, but
conduct that may lead to arrest, such as loitering, public urination, or petty theft, may become more likely in the absence of
treatment and social stability for at least some individuals with
serious mental illnesses.
Third, the primary locus of responsibility for dealing with
these failed treatment systems has shifted in many places from
state government to local communities. The federal government funds many mental-health services through the Medicare
and Medicaid programs but plays virtually no role in designing
treatment systems. State governments traditionally assumed a
leadership role for designing mental health services through
the state mental health agency. However, many states have
reduced funding for mental-health as a percentage of human
services funding, and the authority of many state mentalhealth commissioners has been reduced as states grapple with
rising costs in their Medicaid programs.
While there may not be a direct correlation between these
changes and the impact of mental illnesses on local courts,
they are contextual factors that have shifted the venue for
innovative responses to local communities. Over time, a number of strategies have emerged in various communities that

As indicated above, the volume of persons with mental illness coming into contact with the justice system is so immense
that the majority of communities have developed their own
informal and formal strategies to combat associated issues. We
focus here on formalized strategies that occur at different
points along the criminal justice continuum, including 1) prearrest diversion programs; 2) post-arrest diversion programs,
including mental-health courts; and 3) specialty probation.
Below we provide brief descriptions and operational definitions of these three subtypes. For more detailed information,
we refer interested readers to the National GAINS Center and
its Technical Assistance and Policy Analysis Center for Jail
Diversion11 and the Council of State Governments’ Criminal
Justice Mental Health website.12 These on-line resources offer
many free publications, including guides on how to implement
different diversion programs as well as an overview of the mental health service system for criminal justice professionals.13
Formal diversion programs for persons with mental illness
are growing in popularity and number. While it is accurate to
state that these diversion programs have resulted from local
initiatives, the federal government also has demonstrated support. Specifically, the President’s New Freedom Commission on
Mental Health14 recommended “widely adopting adult criminal justice and juvenile justice diversion….strategies to avoid
the unnecessary criminalization and extended incarceration of
non-violent adult and juvenile offenders with mental illness.”
Further, over the past five years, federal government agencies,
such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Administration, have contributed
millions of dollars in grant funds toward the creation of local
diversion programs.15
Pre-arrest diversion. As the name implies, pre-arrest—or
pre-booking—diversion programs focus on diverting persons
to treatment as an alternative to arrest. Such programs depend
on law enforcement given that police and sheriff’s deputies
make the vast majority of decisions whether or not to arrest an
individual engaged in criminal behavior. It is becoming
increasingly popular because this type of diversion when suc-

10. Relapse is common for the most serious mental illnesses, for
example, schizophrenia. As one group of commentators recently
noted, “the course of early-phase schizophrenia is characterized
by initial improvement in symptoms followed by repeated relapse
and a low rate of sustained recovery.” However, the same authors
note that early intervention with effective medications can result
in good control of symptoms and that even those who may not
respond to treatment of an initial episode of treatment may attain
recovery over time, given adequate treatment. Delbert G.
Robinson et al., Pharmacological Treatments for First-Episode
Schizophrenia, 31 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 705 (2005). Not all mental
illnesses are as devastating as schizophrenia, but because they
often manifest themselves episodically, it is difficult to assume
that an individual with a serious mental illness will necessarily be
wholly compliant with court orders, particularly in the absence of
adequate treatment and supervision.

11. See http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/html/default.asp.
12. See http://www.consensusproject.org/.
13. JACKIE MASSARO, OVERVIEW OF THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS (2005), available at http://
209.132.230.103/pdfs/jail_diversion/MassaroII.pdf.
14. PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING
THE PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HELATH CARE IN AMERICA 4344 (2003) (hereinafter ACHIEVING THE PROMISE], available at http://
www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/FinalReport/toc.html.
15. See, e.g., America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3711, 3796ii-3796ii-7, 3793, Pub. L. 106-515 (2000). It
is also worth noting that these grants have often been comparatively small, and while they have been important in seeding local
projects, the funds allocated by the federal government for diversion are rarely adequate to enable the programs to sustain themselves.

Formal diversion
programs for
persons with
mental illness are
growing in
popularity and
number.
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appear to hold some promise. We discuss the most common
strategies below.
PART 2. STRATEGIES

cessful can have an impact on
court dockets and the use of
jail beds.
There are three basic types
of
pre-arrest
diversion:
1) police-based specialized
police response, 2) policebased specialized mentalhealth response, and 3) mental-health-based specialized
mental-health response.16 In
the first model, police officers are specially trained in crisis
intervention and act as liaisons to the mental-health system. In
the second model, mental-health professionals collaborate
with police to provide on-site or telephone consultation on
responding to individual cases. In the third model, which is the
most common, mental-health professionals provide on-site
help to the police in situations involving persons with mental
illness.17
One of the most successful and most duplicated models for
pre-arrest diversion is the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)
model, originally developed in Memphis, Tennessee. Today,
many major and smaller U.S. cities have adopted CIT programs
of their own. The CIT program in Memphis has been described
in the following manner: A cadre of selected patrol officers (10
to 20 percent of those assigned to patrol) receive extra training
(40 hours initially) and then serve as generalists/specialists;
they perform the full range of regular patrol duties, but respond
immediately (from anywhere in the city) whenever crisis situations occur involving people with mental illness. In those situations, these officers assume on-scene command as soon as they
arrive. They are trained to handle the crisis situations as well as
to facilitate the delivery of treatment and other services. In particular, they become knowledgeable about voluntary and involuntary commitment, plus they become well known to professionals in the mental-health community, facilitating the delivery of treatment and other services to the people in crisis.18
Three core factors have been identified as essential to the
success of a pre-arrest diversion program. The first is training.
The Memphis CIT model prides itself on its 40-hour (plus)
intensive training for officers selected for the program. The cur-

riculum includes information on mental illness, crisis skills,
and a heavy concentration on interactive activities, such as role
play. Refresher trainings are utilized as well. The second core
element is the creation of partnerships between community
mental-health providers and law-enforcement officials. Prearrest diversion programs require that police have access to
treatment services reliably, predictably, and at all hours. If an
officer finds it more difficult to gain access to assessment and
treatment than to arrest the individual, diversion programs will
founder. Therefore, in developing this option, communities
often use a single point of entry to services, assure that no one
referred for services will be refused at least an assessment, and
provide streamlined intakes for police officers.19 The third core
element is re-conceptualizing the traditional police-officer role
for the specialized-diversion officers. That is, under the CIT
model, officers volunteer or are specially selected rather than
randomly assigned, and the agency promotes collegiality and a
sense of shared responsibility among the officers. It is also
important that relevant statutes and policies encourage and
support rather than create impediments to diversion. For example, crisis facilities must be enabled legally to accept and detain
persons who may or may not have criminal charges pending.
Early research suggests that pre-arrest diversion programs
can be successful in creating access to treatment without creating additional community risk. For example, in comparison
to persons not diverted, persons diverted were more likely to
be in counseling and to be taking prescribed medications. Rearrest rates were not higher than those for non-diverted populations, despite the fact that individuals diverted before arrest
were typically in the community for longer periods of time
(and therefore potentially at risk for behavior leading to
another arrest) than non-diverted individuals.20 Currently, a
major evaluation is underway of 32 pre and post-booking
diversion programs, which may provide more definitive
answers to whether pre-diversion programs are successful, for
whom, and why.
Post-arrest diversion. After a person is arrested, formal
diversion can occur at any point during the criminal process.
We first discuss post-arrest, or post-booking diversion programs generally, and address mental-health courts (MHCs)
separately.

16. For discussions of the various methods for organizing pre-arrest
diversion, see Martha Williams-Dean et al., Emerging Partnerships
between Mental Health and Law Enforcement, 50 PSYCH. SERVICES 99
(1999); Henry Steadman et al., Comparing Outcomes of Major
Models of Police Responses to Mental Health Emergencies, 51 PSYCH.
SERVICES 645 (2000).
17. MELISSA REULAND, A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING POLICE-BASED
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2004),
available at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/pdfs/jail_diversion/
PERF.pdf.
18. This description is taken from an article at the website of the
Center for Problem-Oriented Policing: Gary Cordner, People with
Mental Illness 4 (2006), available at http://popcenter.org/
problems/mental_illness. The article provides a good description
not only of the CIT model but also of a number of other
approaches adopted by police departments across the United
States in addressing issues involving people with mental illnesses.

The growing popularity of CIT as a strategy is reflected in attendance at the 2nd National CIT Conference held in fall 2006 in
Orlando. It was attended by more than 800 individuals from 40
states, Canada, and Australia. Many of the attendees were police
officers, and there were a number of judges in attendance and presenting as well.
19. Henry Steadman et al., A Specialized Crisis Response as a Core
Element of Police-Based Diversion Programs, 52 PSYCH. SERVICES 219
(2001).
20. See Michelle Naples & Henry Steadman, Can Persons with CoOccurring Disorders and Violent Charges Be Successfully Diverted?,
2 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 137 (2003); THE NATIONAL
GAINS CTR. FOR PEOPLE WITH CO-OCCURRING DISORDERS IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, WHAT CAN WE SAY ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
JAIL DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR PERSONS WITH CO-OCCURRING
DISABILITIES? (2004), available at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/
pdfs/jail_diversion/WhatCanWeSay.pdf.

Three core factors
have been
identified as
essential to the
success of a prearrest diversion
program.
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Post-booking diversion. Post-booking diversion programs,
like pre-arrest diversion programs, seek to engage eligible persons in community treatment with the hope that treatment will
reduce the risk of behavior leading to future arrests. An obvious difference between the two approaches is that pre-arrest
diversion attempts to keep the person from entering the criminal justice system at all, while post-arrest programs are not
used until the person has already been arrested.
Post-booking diversion programs may seek to divert the
individual to treatment at any point during the criminal
process, and therefore, depending on the program, referrals
may come from a variety of parties to the criminal justice system, including jail officials, law enforcement, magistrates,
judges, and attorneys. One commentator suggests that there
are two particularly important points at which defendants may
be diverted post-arrest. The first is at the person’s first court
appearance, which in many jurisdictions will occur within a
day or two after arrest. At this point, an arraigning judge might
order the person released to community treatment as an alternative to continuing custody. A second point at which diversion might occur is when the prosecutor decides whether to
proceed with charges. If the prosecutor is aware that the person has been accepted into a diversion program, he or she may
be more willing to hold charges in abeyance pending successful completion of the program. Six critical elements of these
diversion strategies have been identified: 1) involvement of all
key parties (e.g., judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, mental-health providers, etc.), 2) strong judicial leadership, 3)
quick access to services to assess the defendant’s mental health,
4) availability of mental-health-treatment resources, 5) assistance to the defendant in complying with imposed treatment
conditions, and 6) patience among professionals from differing
and sometimes conflicting systems. Of importance, both
options—pretrial release and deferred prosecution—can occur
in a matter of days after arrest.21
Post-diversion arrest also can take place much later. For
example, a person may come before another judge who suspects the person may have a mental illness and be eligible for
diversion. Similarly, a person’s attorney, after some interaction,
may conclude that the best option for his or her client is the
diversion program. Diversion may even occur after sentencing,
such that the sentence of jail or prison time is put on hold
pending successful completion of treatment. Each of these
options is available even if there is no formal effort at diversion; however, many communities have begun to attempt to
formalize the processes by which defendants may be diverted

into treatment as the crimNew York City’s
inal process proceeds.
A successful example of Nathaniel Project . . .
a post-booking diversion
began in 2000 and
program attempting to
appears to be very
address the needs of indieffective in gaining
viduals charged with
felonies is New York City’s
access to treatment
Nathaniel Project. The
while reducing
Nathaniel
Project
is
re-arrest . . . .
“exclusively for people
with psychiatric disabilities who have been indicted on a felony offense and are facing
a lengthy sentence in New York State prison…. the program
will consider any defendant regardless of offense, including
violent offenses.”22 The Nathaniel Project began in 2000 and
appears to be very effective in gaining access to treatment
while reducing re-arrest: new arrests among their clients have
dramatically decreased, 100% of their clients are engaged in
treatment, and after one year, 79% had permanent housing.
While many communities will choose not to focus diversion
efforts on those charged with felonies, the Nathaniel Project
provides evidence that diversion to treatment in lieu of incarceration can be effective in some circumstances even for a difficult population of offenders with mental illness.
Mental-health courts. Mental-health courts are one of the
fastest growing vehicles for addressing the needs of mentally ill
defendants. The first two mental-health courts appeared in
1997 in Marion County, Indiana and Broward County, Florida.
However, today, there are estimated to be more than 150 U.S.
mental-health courts with the number continuing to grow
rapidly. A survey completed in January 2005 determined that
MHCs were in operation in 34 states with many of the states
operating multiple MHCs in different counties and jurisdictions.23 Like other diversion programs, these therapeutic
courts attempt to provide defendants with access to treatment
and oversight with the goal of reducing the likelihood of future
cycling through the criminal justice system.
Although MHCs vary in their procedures, operations, and
eligibility requirements, there are several defining characteristics. First, MHCs are criminal courts, usually with one judge
carrying a dedicated docket.24 Second, MHCs typically have
mental-health and criminal justice eligibility criteria in that
they will only allow in persons with certain diagnoses and/or
certain criminal charges. Earlier, or first-generation, mentalhealth courts usually limited their docket to misdemeanants,

21. For a general discussion of this type of diversion, see JOHN CLARK,
NON-SPECIALTY FIRST APPEARANCE COURT MODELS FOR DIVERTING
PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: ALTERNATIVES TO MENTAL HEALTH
COURTS (2004), available at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/pdfs/
jail_diversion/pre_trial_nocover.pdf.
22. For a description of the Nathaniel Project, see THE NATIONAL
GAINS CTR. FOR PEOPLE WITH CO-OCCURRING DISORDERS IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, THE NATHANIEL PROJECT: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
INCARCERATION PROGRAM FOR PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS
WHO HAVE COMMITTED FELONY OFFENSES (rev. ed. 2005), available
at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/pdfs/jail_diversion/nathaniel_
project.pdf.

23. Allison D. Redlich et al., Patterns of Pracice in Mental Health
Courts: A National Survey, 30 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 347
(2006).
24. It is worth noting that most mental-health courts have been created from existing resources; few jurisdictions have obtained
additional judicial or attorney resources for these courts. In addition, caseloads in most jurisdictions are comparatively small (a
mental-health court with a docket of more than 100 cases would
be a relatively large mental-health court), and so the judge who
presides over the court typically does so in addition to his or her
usual responsibilities.
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but a number of more recent courts use a mixed (misdemeanor-felony) caseload or only felony cases.25 Third, MHCs
not only require the defendant to receive treatment but also
arrange for supervision and oversight of treatment compliance.
Oversight takes several forms; for example, the judge will hold
periodic status hearings on most cases, and ongoing supervision is provided by the probation officers, case managers,
and/or MHC personnel. Fourth, the courts use a mix of incentives and sanctions in an effort to gain compliance. Incentives
might include praise in the courtroom from the judge or gift
cards marking progress with treatment, while punishment can
range from reprimands from the judge to incarceration. Fifth,
the courts generally adopt the philosophy of “therapeutic
jurisprudence,” which is an approach to law that places the
therapeutic or non-therapeutic impact of legal rules and
processes at the core of judging and practice.26 Finally, participation in all mental-health courts is voluntary, and it is generally estimated that approximately 5% of defendants offered
participation in a mental-health court decline.27
While MHCs continue to proliferate, they are not without
controversy. Some of the controversies concern the use of jail
as a sanction, whether the courts are truly voluntary, and
whether MHCs are appropriate venues for persons charged
with low-level crimes. Another issue is whether or not the
courts “work.” That is, do mental-health courts cause people
to engage in treatment and ultimately reduce or eliminate
future criminal justice involvement? Preliminary research suggests that the courts can be effective, especially when demographic, criminal, and diagnostic factors are considered, but
the studies done to date have been of single courts, and so it is
difficult to generalize from their findings.28
To encourage standardization of MHC operations and
requirements, the Council of State Governments (CSG) has
proposed 10 “essential elements” of mental-health-court design
and implementation.29 Although we list them here, readers are
referred to the original document for more specific information
on each element. The elements that must be tended to in the
CSG’s judgment are 1) Planning and Administration,
2) Identification of the Target Population, 3) Timely Participant

Identification and Linkage to
[T]he Council of
Services, 4) Terms of Participation, 5) Informed Choice, State Governments
has proposed
6) Treatment Supports and
Services, 7) Confidentiality,
10 “essential
8) Identi-fication of the
elements” of
Mental Health Court Team,
mental health court
9) Monitoring Adherence to
design and
Court Requirements, and
implementation.
10) Sustainability. In addition, CSG has identified five
MHCs as “learning sites.” The learning sites have been designated to provide support, including observation opportunities,
to other courts looking to set up or expand upon an existing
mental health court.” The five courts were chosen primarily
because of their fidelity to the Essential Elements. Judges and
others who are considering establishing a MHC in their community might first obtain the Essential Elements of a Mental
Health Court guide, and perhaps contact one or more of the
MHCs identified as learning sites.30
Specialty probation. A more recent development for
addressing the needs of defendants with mental illness is specialty probation. Because probationers with mental-health
issues often have distinct issues that might affect their ability
to comply with the usual conditions of probation, they may
require more intensive supervision. While specialty probation
is not a diversion program, a growing emphasis on it as a tool
makes it worth mentioning here.
As discussed by Skeem, Emke-Francis, and Eno Louden,31
specialty probation differs from traditional probation in several
ways. In comparison to traditional probation officers, specialty
probation officers 1) have exclusive caseloads of persons with
mental illness, 2) have reduced caseloads (e.g., 30 open cases),
and 3) receive mental-health training. Additionally, specialty
probation officers tend to forge close working relationships
with other professionals in the community relevant to the probationers’ well-being. For example, specialty probation officers
report having close relationships with treatment providers and

25. Allison Redlich et al., The Second Generation of Mental Health
Courts, 11 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 527 (2005).
26. David Wexler and Bruce Winick, two law professors, are primarily responsible for the emergence of “therapeutic jurisprudence”
as an approach to law. They have written extensively regarding the
topic, as well as the manner in which therapeutic jurisprudence
might be applied to various legal issues. One of their books is
devoted specifically to therapeutic jurisprudence and the role of a
judge. BRUCE WINICK & DAVID WEXLER, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC
KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (2003).
27. Allison Redlich, Voluntary, But Knowing and Intelligent?
Comprehension in Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y &
LAW 605 (2005).
28. For results from two single court studies, see Annette Christy et
al., Evaluating the Efficiency and Community Safety Goals of the
Broward County Mental Health Court, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 227
(2005); Merith Cosden, Jeffrey Ellens, Jeffrey Schnell & Yasmeen

Yamini-Diouf, Efficacy of a Mental Health Treatment Court with
Assertive Community Treatment, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 199 (2005),
available at http://czresearch.com/dropbox/Cosden_BehavSci
Law_2005v23p199.pdf.
29. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, IMPROVING
RESPONSES TO PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES: THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF A MENTAL HEALTH COURT (2008), available at
http://consensusproject.org/mhcp/essential.elements.pdf.
30. Id. Additional resources may be viewed at http://consensuspro
ject.org. The five learning sites are the Akron (Ohio) Municipal
Mental Health Court, the Bonneville (Idaho) County Mental
Health Court, the Bronx (New York) County Mental Health
Court, the Dougherty (Georgia) Superior Court, and the Washoe
County (New York) Mental Health Court. See http://consensus
project.org/mhcp/.
31. Jennifer Skeem et al., Probation, Mental Health, and Mandated
Treatment, 33 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAV. 158 (2006).
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case managers. Finally, specialty officers report utilizing problem-solving strategies as their first strategy to
deal with probationers’ noncompliance (e.g., generating
alternative strategies, and
modifying treatment plans
jointly with the probationer)
rather than initially seeking
punishment for violation of
probation
conditions.
Currently, a comprehensive
research study is underway
comparing outcomes (e.g., re-arrests, treatment utilization) of
probationers under traditional and specialty models.

All judges with a criminal docket must address issues created by the presence of growing numbers of defendants with
serious mental illnesses. However, individual judges will have
different views about the appropriateness of assuming an
active role in addressing these issues.
A recent article in this journal by Roger Hanson asserted,
“…there are few judges who would claim that judging today is
just like it was 30 years ago, or like they think it was 30 years
ago.”32 Hanson observed that the emergence of problem-solving courts and problem-solving judges was having a significant
impact on the discussion regarding judicial role. He characterized the discussion in the following manner:
“Frequently the discussion is framed in terms of whether
the judiciary should be expected to behave in one of two polaropposite ways. Should they be primarily almost aloof finders of
fact, impartial and nearly devoid of intimate contact with and

knowledge of litigants and their circumstances? Or should
they be one of many possible partners to a diagnostic, therapeutically oriented response process to ameliorate underlying
and messy problems of litigants?”33
Therefore, the manner in which a particular judge defines
his or her role is a threshold question that will significantly
influence whether the judge then plays the additional roles
described briefly below. It should be noted that there is considerable evidence that many judges are interested in assuming
a more active role in assuring access to community services for
defendants with mental illnesses or substance-abuse problems
and for those who have been victims of domestic violence.34
The judge as community convener and leader. Problemsolving or therapeutic courts by definition create a different
relationship between the court and the surrounding community. Community treatment providers may lack experience in
dealing with the needs of individuals who come into treatment
through the criminal justice system, may be reluctant to assume
responsibility for such clients because of liability concerns, and
may be wary of working too closely with the criminal courts.35
In addition, the lack of adequate housing is a systemic issue
that affects the ability of nearly all people with serious mental
illnesses to live successfully in the community and will become
an issue for judges who seek to achieve successful treatment
outcomes for defendants, particularly in therapeutic courts.36
For these reasons and for the reasons noted in Part 1 of this
article, a judge who wishes to play an active role in addressing
mental-illness issues may find that leadership is not forthcoming from the treatment community. As a result, a judge may find
that assuming a leadership role is critical in bringing together
community stakeholders. There has been considerable commentary in the last decade regarding why and how courts might
reach out to communities, so the topic is not new.37 The need
for such a leadership role also is assumed as a sine qua non for

32. Roger Hanson, The Changing Role of a Judge and Its Implications,
COURT REVIEW, Winter 2002, at 10.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Aubrey Fox, And the Survey Says . . . : State Court Judges
and Problem-Solving Courts, in CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, A
PROBLEM-SOLVING REVOLUTION, MAKING CHANGE HAPPEN IN STATE
COURTS (2004); Fox’s chapter is available at http://www.courtinFox
novation.org/_uploads/documents/andthesurveysays.pdf.
reports the majority of judges responding to a survey of approximately 500 judges believed that the courts should be active in
attempting to create access to services; he also reported widespread interest in problem-solving courts among the respondents.
In a number of judicial systems, creating access to treatment for
some types of defendants has become an article of faith; for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has asserted
“Court involvement creates a crisis in a person’s life, and courts
are uniquely situated to take advantage of the crisis by directing
the person toward treatment. A timely response to the individual’s
crisis is most likely to lead to success in treatment.” Supreme
Judicial Court Standards on Substance Abuse, Standard 5,
Commentary. This and the other standards set by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court can be found at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/substancev.html
35. DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, RETHINKING THE REVOLVING

DOOR: A LOOK AT MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE COURTS (2001), available
at http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/rethink
ingtherevolvingdoor.pdf.
36. Finding housing for people with mental illnesses is a long-standing problem in part because of stigma associated with mental illness and in part for economic reasons. In the last two decades,
there has been significant experimentation with different models
of housing, particularly regarding the linkage between housing
and treatment. See, e.g., Sam Tsemberis, Ph.D. & Ronda F.
Eisenberg, M.A., Pathways to Housing: Supported Housing for
Street-Dwelling Homeless Individuals with Psychiatric Disabilities,
51 PSYCH. SERVICES 487 (2000); Pamela Clark Robbins et al., The
Use of Housing as Leverage to Increase Adherence to Psychiatric
Treatment in the Community, 33 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HELATH &
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES RES. 226 (2006).
37. For example, David Rottman et al. have suggested that six benefits accrue from judicial outreach to communities: 1) an opportunity to influence public opinion and increase accessibility and
fairness, 2) the opportunity to permit judges to respond to public
criticism thereby strengthening judicial independence, 3) the
opportunity to create better case dispositions, 4) the opportunity
to create new programs required by defendants and victims in
court proceedings, 5) an opportunity to strengthen communities
by combining the force of judicial sanctions with the power of
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judges overseeing therapeutic
courts.38 However, a judge
may wish to convene community leaders before a therapeutic court or other specific initiatives are developed. A
judge may be the one community official with sufficient
prestige and authority to create a venue for discussion
that other community leaders
feel obligated to attend.
Indeed, the Conference of
Chief Justices, in the resolution noted at the beginning of
this article, stated, “while
leadership can come from different facets of the criminal justice
and mental health systems, judges are particularly well positioned to lead reform efforts because of their unique ability to
convene stakeholders.”39
In considering strategies for addressing mental-illness
issues, a judge might consider convening a number of parties,
including the state’s attorney, the public defender, the major
local treatment providers, the local hospital that operates the
major emergency services (since many people with mental illnesses may be hospitalized in the emergency room during an
acute phase of illness), the sheriff and other local law-enforcement representatives, and social-welfare administrators. Each
of these parties (and this list may not be exhaustive) will have

some responsibility for—and feel the impact of—the issues
associated with serious mental illness. Each will be necessary
to creating any solutions to these issues.
If such a meeting occurs, little can be done in a single session. In most communities, these are parties that are typically
not used to working together, and the building of enough trust
to have non-defensive conversations occur ordinarily takes
time. But over time, at least three things may happen. First,
some measure of trust will develop. Second, once it does, problem identification may occur at both the individual-case level
and at a systemic level. In many communities, a number of
individuals will be known to all parts of the system; discussion
of those individuals may assist in identifying gaps in services
at a more general level.40 Finally, such meetings, over time, will
enable community leaders to discuss a variety of strategies,
rather than a single strategy. Not every strategy fits every community, and efforts by one part of the criminal justice or treatment systems to impose a solution on all parts of those systems
may have little chance of success. However, a group of community leaders that has developed trust may have the opportunity to sift through a variety of strategies, considering them
against the backdrop of the group’s collective knowledge of
local resources, capacities, and political realities.41
The judge as program designer. Few communities have
adequate treatment capacity for individuals with mental illnesses, and judges may conclude that treatment services for
defendants in the criminal justice system are particularly lacking. This may be true, especially for the very high percentage
of defendants with co-occurring mental illness and substance-

community networks to create better access to treatment and
other resources, and 6) an opportunity to better accommodate
concerns regarding diversity. David B. Rottman, Pamela Casey &
Hillery Efkeman, Court and Community Collaboration: Ends and
Means (1998), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/community/endsmeans.htm. For another of many examples, the work of the California Court and Community
Collaboration Project provides a number of documents on community collaboration largely initiated by the courts. See
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/community/
38. In other countries where therapeutic courts have been created, the
judge as community leader is also considered essential. For example, a commentary reporting on such courts in Australia, Canada,
and the United States observed “Judges in community courts are
expected to have a high profile in the local community and to
maintain good contacts with the community leaders. This is outside the normal judicial role.” JOYCE PLOTNIKOFF & RICHARD
WOOLFSON, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIALIST COURTS IN
OTHER JURISDICTIONS (2005), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/
research/2005/3_2005.pdf.
39. Conference of Chief Justices, supra note 1.
40. The identification of needs within a particular system has become
quite sophisticated in recent years. One example, called
Sequential Intercept Mapping Training, enables community representatives to create a map of how individuals with mental illnesses
move across the criminal justice (and treatment) systems. In turn,
this permits better planning for the allocation of assessment and
treatment resources, as well as the identification of gaps in services. Information about this training may be obtained at

http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/html/tta/trainings.asp.
41. There are many examples of judicial leadership in convening community stakeholders on these issues. One occurred in Miami,
Dade County, Florida, where the county was paying 16 million
dollars per year to house and treat people with mental illnesses in
the jail. Under the leadership of Judge Steve Leifman, a summit of
key stakeholders was convened; this in turn led to the creation of
Miami-Dade’s 11th Judicial Circuit Criminal Mental Health
Project under Judge Leifman’s leadership. The group, which continues to meet, has been instrumental in efforts to create systemic
responses to these issues. For a description, see http://
www.naco.org/CountyNewsTemplate.cfm?template=/ContentMan
agement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8091. In Broward
County, Florida, Judge Mark Speiser created a multiagency
Criminal Justice Mental Health Task Force in 1994. The Task
Force continues to meet and has spawned a number of initiatives,
including two mental-health courts (the first a misdemeanor
court, the second a felony court) and specialty probation. In Ohio,
Supreme Court Justice Evelyn Stratton has been a forceful advocate for the creation of mental-health courts, and, at least in part
as a result, Ohio has more mental-health courts than any state in
the United States. More recently, the Florida Supreme Court,
under Judge Leifman’s leadership, published a comprehensive
report suggesting reforms in both the mental-health and criminal
justice systems to provide better care for people with mental illnesses at risk of entering the criminal justice system. The report
can be found at http://mhlp.fmhi.usf.edu/web/mhlp/documents/
Supreme-Court-Report-2007.pdf.
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abuse diagnoses. Treatment is often lacking for people with cooccurring disorders in the general population, and so the lack
of adequate treatment capacity will be an issue confronting
therapeutically oriented judges as well.42
Given these difficulties, judges may find themselves a part of
an effort to create or design treatment and other services for
defendants. Certainly there is precedent for this; judges presiding over drug courts are often intimately involved in overseeing
treatment, and drug courts may operate services directly as well
as contract with other treatment providers.43 While a discussion
of appropriate treatment services for defendants with mental illnesses is beyond the scope of this article, a judge in this position might consider the following:
First, creation of the capacity to assess serious mentalhealth issues rapidly and effectively is important, clinically and
programmatically. From a clinical perspective, early assessment increases the chances for effective treatment to be provided. From a programmatic perspective, early assessment is
important in determining whether an individual is suited for a
particular intervention, for example, whether the individual
meets criteria governing admission to a mental-health court.
Therefore, the availability of good assessment services is critical, whether a community focuses on pre-arrest diversion,
therapeutic courts, or post-sentencing alternatives such as specialty probation.44
Second, the development of treatment services does not
occur in a scientific vacuum. In recent years, there has been a
move toward the use of “evidence-based practices” for treating
mental illnesses. Such practices are based on research and have
been described as “specific interventions and treatment models that have been shown to improve client functioning and the
course of severe mental illness.”45 According to the President’s
New Freedom Commission on Mental Health, a number of
treatments can be characterized as evidence-based practices,
including specific medications for specific conditions, cogni-

tive and interpersonal theraFrequently the
pies for depression, preventive interventions for chil- discussion is framed
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child interaction therapy,
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ily
psycho-education,
of two polarassertive community treatopposite ways.
ment, and collaborative
treatment in primary care.46
It should be noted that these treatments have not been proved
effective in treating every type of mental illness, and therefore
should not be adopted without first considering the clinical
profile of individuals that are the focus of an intervention.
However, they can provide a common frame of reference for
discussions between representatives of the criminal justice and
mental-health treatment systems.
Third, the use of “boundary spanners” seems essential to
cross-system collaboration. Henry Steadman describes boundary spanners as positions that link two or more systems whose
goals and expectations are at least partially conflicting.47
Specifically, an individual in a boundary-spanning position
manages the day-to-day interactions between the criminal justice and mental-health systems. Whether the person works for
the criminal justice system or the mental-health system is less
important than whether the person has authority to make decisions regarding interactions between the systems.48
The judge as advocate. Judges may not act as lobbyists for
ethical and legal reasons. However, judges increasingly play a
role as advocates for services to people with mental illnesses.
This role as advocate is a natural out-growth for a judge who
becomes a community leader on these issues or who presides
over a therapeutic court such as a mental-health court.

42. The President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health
found that individuals with co-occurring mental-illness and substance-abuse disorders are “treated for only one of the two disorders—if they are treated at all.” According to the Commission,
only 19% of individuals with serious co-occurring disorders
received treatment for both disorders, while 29% received treatment for neither. The Commission observed that such individuals
often use the most expensive forms of care, including hospital
emergency rooms and inpatient facilities, and that the lack of
treatment increased their risk for suicide attempts, violent behavior, legal problems, serious medical problems, and homelessness.
See ACHIEVING THE PROMISE, supra note 14.
43. For a good overall discussion of drug courts, including recidivism
and treatment issues, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS
AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05219.pdf.
44. Rapid assessment has long been a benchmark of drug-court programs, and it is also considered critical in the treatment of mental
illnesses more generally. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG CT.
PROFESSIONALS, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS
(1997 ed., reprinted 2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

BJA/grant/DrugCourts/DefiningDC.pdf. See also ACHIEVING THE
PROMISE, supra note 14.
45. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH
CONSENSUS PROJECT 251 (2002), available at http://consensusproject.org/downloads/Entire_report.pdf. Policy Statement No. 35 of
the consensus project report urges the use of evidence-based practices in mental-health treatment. Id. at 250-56.
46. ACHIEVING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, Goal 5. The development
of evidence-based practices is in an embryonic stage, and there is
not complete consensus on which treatments should be classified
as evidence-based practices. In addition, most jurisdictions rely
on a treatment system in which some or all such practices are
absent. This does not mean that treatment in such jurisdictions is
necessarily suspect in all cases; however, in developing services to
fill gaps in treatment, it seems useful to focus on evidence-based
practices as an anchor for discussion.
47. Henry J. Steadman, Boundary Spanners: A Key Component for the
Effective Interactions of the Justice and Mental Health Systems, 16
LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 75 (1992).
48. Steadman notes that there is no best way to create a boundaryspanner position and that deciding where to place a boundaryspanner position “depends upon local politics, history, economics,
and personalities.” Id. at 84 n.23.
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An example of such advocacy, as part of a broader coalition
of stakeholders, is provided by the Florida Partners in Crisis.
This coalition was begun in central Florida in 1999 under the
leadership of Judge Belvin Perry in response to mental-health
and substance-use issues affecting the mental-health system.
Members include judges, law-enforcement officials, behavioral-health providers, correctional officials, and family members. Partners in Crisis has a number of goals, including
increasing public awareness of mental-health and substanceuse service needs throughout Florida.49
The emergence of organizations like Partners in Crisis is an
important development politically. For years, mental-health
providers, in particular, were suspicious of the legal system
and the courts for a variety of reasons including malpractice
concerns, and treatment providers also associated client
involvement in the legal process with long, uncompensated
hours spent waiting to testify. However, given declining financial support for mental-health services in many states, and
given the reality that law-enforcement officials typically have
more clout politically than mental-health providers, a coalition
such as Partners in Crisis has the potential to focus legislative
and executive branch attention on service needs in a way that
treatment providers, acting alone, often cannot.
The judge as a member of the treatment team. Finally,
therapeutic courts, in particular, require the judge to play a
role that may conflict with the more traditional role of the
judge. One commentator in this journal has written,
“Specialized courts…are manifestations of a change in the role
of the judge from ‘dispassionate, disinterested magistrate’ to
that of a ‘sensitive, emphatic counselor.”50 Justice Kaye, Chief
of the New York Court of Appeals, has observed that therapeutic courts require a change in the role of lawyers as well,
writing that in therapeutic courts, “the lawyers also have new
roles. The prosecution and defense are not sparring champions, they are members of a team with a common goal: Getting
the defendant off drugs. When this goal is attained, everyone
wins. Defendants win dismissal of their charges…the public
wins safer streets and reduced recidivism.”51
Others have criticized these roles on a number of grounds
including a claim that they may lead to the derogation of
important legal rights enjoyed by the defendant. As noted earlier, this conflict over judicial role is not new. Boldt, for example, has argued that the creation of a “therapeutic relationship”
between judge and defendant may compromise the role of
defense counsel, among other things.52

Indeed, these arguments over the appropriate role of judges
and lawyers have been at the heart of many of the debates
regarding such roles in the context of civil commitment.53 As
with other role issues discussed in this article, judges will
make individual decisions regarding the roles they wish to
play, but the potential role conflict is worth noting.
Judges are providing critical leadership in communities
across the United States in responding to the crisis of mental
illness in the criminal justice system. In doing so, judges have
adopted new and sometimes unfamiliar roles. While not all
judges are comfortable with these new roles, it seems clear that
in many instances, reform is simply impossible without judicial leadership.

49. For a description of Partners in Crisis and its membership and
activities, see http://www.flpic.org.
50. David Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require
Specialized Courts (And Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist
Judges)?, COURT REVIEW, Spring 2000, at 22. Rottman provides an
excellent summary of the arguments for and against specialization. He concludes that “the long-term future of the new specialized courts depends upon their successful incorporation into
larger trial court systems…the investment of so many resources in
special courts must ultimately be justified in terms of their role as
agents of change beyond a few courtrooms.” Id. at 26.

51. Judith Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1
(1998).
52. Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Court
Treatment Movement, 76 WASHINGTON UNIV. L.Q. 1206 (1998).
53. The most used legal textbook on mental-disability law notes
“numerous studies have documented that attorneys rarely spend
more than a few minutes preparing for the [civil commitment]
hearing, seldom call witnesses, and usually fail to engage in vigorous cross-examination of the experts.” RALPH REISNER,
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & ARTI RAI, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 800 (4th ed. 2003).
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